In a lengthy decision covering historical computer copyright case law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled on the copyright dispute over the Android smart phone operating system in Oracle America Inc. v. Google Inc., Fed. Cir. Case No. 2013-1021 (May 9, 2014) (available here). The Court reversed the district court’s decision on the non-copyrightability of the Java code used by Google and remanded the matter for a new trial on the issue of fair use.
The copyright dispute involved 37 packages of computer source code. “The parties have often referred to these groups of computer programs, individually or collectively, as ‘application programming interfaces,’ or API packages, but it is their content, not their name, that matters. Many software developers use the Java language, as well as Oracle’s API packages, to write applications (commonly referred to as ‘apps’) for desktop and laptop computers, tablets, smartphones, and other devices.” opn. pg. 4. Oracle alleged that Google’s Android mobile operating system infringed Oracle’s patents and copyrights. The Federal Circuit handled the appeal due to the presence of a patent infringement claim but the appeal involved copyright infringement. The Federal Circuit was therefore obliged to apply Ninth Circuit copyright law. The jury had found that Google did not infringe Oracle’s patents.
The parties agreed that the jury would decide infringement, fair use, and whether any copying was de minimis and the district judge would decide copyrightability and Google’s equitable defenses. The jury found that Google infringed Oracle’s copyrights in the 37 Java packages and a specific computer routine called ‘rangeCheck,’ but returned a noninfringement verdict as to eight decompiled security files. The jury deadlocked on Google’s fair use defense. After the trial, the district court granted Oracle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and found that: (1) Google admitted to copying the eight files; and (2) no reasonable jury could find that the copying was de minimis. Shortly thereafter, the district court issued its decision on copyrightability, finding that the replicated elements of the 37 API packages—including the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization—were not subject to copyright protection.
Oracle’s Java platform includes the Java development kit (JDK), javac compiler, tools and utilities, runtime programs, class libraries (API packages), and the Java virtual machine. These packages, which are the application programming interfaces a issue in this appeal, allow programmers to use the prewritten code to build certain functions into their own programs, rather than write their own code to perform those functions from scratch. They are shortcuts. Oracle offers three different licenses: a free, open source General Public License (users must contribute back innovations to the public), a specification license and a commercial license (for use of the entire code and to keep the code secret). Oracle and Google could not agree on a license because Google wanted a ‘write once, run anywhere’ operating system. Google wanted other programmers to write apps for the Google Java-based smart phone.
“To achieve this ‘write once, run everywhere’ result, Google copied the declaring source code from the 37 Java API packages verbatim, inserting that code into parts of its Android software. In doing so, Google copied the elaborately organized taxonomy of all the names of methods, classes, interfaces, and packages — the ‘overall system of organized names—covering 37 packages, with over six hundred classes, with over six thousand methods.’” opn. pg. 10 – 11.
“Although [Google] acknowledged that the overall structure of Oracle’s API packages is creative, original, and resembles a taxonomy, the district court found that it is nevertheless a command structure, a system or method of operation — a long hierarchy of over six thousand commands to carry out pre-assigned functions — that is not entitled to copyright protection under Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that, [o]f the 166 Java packages, 129 were not violated in any way. And, of the 37 Java API packages at issue, ‘97 percent of the Android lines were new from Google and the remaining three percent were freely replicable under the merger and names doctrines. On these grounds, the court dismissed Oracle’s copyright claims, concluding that the particular elements replicated by Google were free for all to use under the Copyright Act.” opn. pg. 14 (quotations and record citations omitted).
Per the Federal Circuit, “It is undisputed that Google copied 7,000 lines of declaring code and generally replicated the overall structure, sequence, and organization of Oracle’s 37 Java API packages.” opn. pg. 15.
The Copyright Act provides protection to original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, including literary works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). It is undisputed that computer programs — defined in the Copyright Act as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result,” 17 U.S.C. § 101 — can be subject to copyright protection as literary works. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea — not to the underlying idea itself. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). The idea/expression dichotomy traces back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879).
“It is well established that copyright protection can extend to both literal and non-literal elements of a computer program. … The non-literal components of a computer program include,
among other things, the program’s sequence, structure, and organization, as well as the program’s user interface.” opn. pg. 20.
“Although the parties agree that Oracle’s API packages meet the originality requirement under Section 102(a), they disagree as to the proper interpretation and application of Section 102(b). For its part, Google suggests that there is a two-step copyrightability analysis, wherein Section 102(a) grants copyright protection to original works, while Section 102(b) takes it away if the work has a functional component. To the contrary, however, Congress emphasized that Section 102(b) ‘in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection’ and that its ‘purpose is to restate . . . that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.’ Feist,
499 U.S. at 356″ opn. pg 22.
The Federal Circuit adopted the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. “In the abstraction step, the court first breaks down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts. In the filtration step, the court sifts out all non-protectable material, including ideas and expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas. In the final step, the court compares the remaining creative expression with the allegedly infringing program.” opn. pg. 23 – 24 (quotes omitted).
“In all circuits, it is clear that the first step is part of the copyrightability analysis and that the third is an infringement question. It is at the second step of this analysis where the circuits are in less accord.” opn pg. 24
“In the Ninth Circuit, while questions regarding originality are considered questions of copyrightability, concepts of merger and scenes a faire are affirmative defenses to claims of infringement. Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 n.3 (9th Cir.
2003)” opn. pg. 25.
“Under the merger doctrine, a court will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the idea contained therein can be expressed in only one way. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003).”
“First, we agree that merger cannot bar copyright protection for any lines of declaring source code unless Sun/Oracle had only one way, or a limited number of ways, to write them. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 812 n.5 (‘Under the merger doctrine, courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the idea underlying the copyrighted work can be expressed in only one way, lest there be a monopoly on the underlying idea.’). The evidence showed that Oracle had ‘unlimited options as to the selection and arrangement of the 7000 lines Google copied.’ Appellant Br. 50.”
“The scenes a faire doctrine, which is related to the merger doctrine, operates to bar certain otherwise creative expression from copyright protection. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). It provides that ‘expressive elements of a work of authorship are not entitled to protection against infringement if they are standard, stock, or common to a topic, or if they necessarily follow from a common theme or setting.’ Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1374. Under this doctrine, ‘when certain commonplace expressions are indispensable and naturally associated with the treatment of a given idea, those expressions are treated like ideas and therefore [are] not protected by copyright.’ Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). In the computer context, ‘the scene a faire doctrine denies protection to program elements that are dictated by external factors such as ‘the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run’ or ‘widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry.’‘ Softel, 118 F.3d at 963 (citation omitted).” opn pg. 35.
“Like merger, the focus of the scenes a faire doctrine is on the circumstances presented to the creator, not the copier. See Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375 (finding error to the extent the trial court discussed ‘whether external factors such as market forces and efficiency considerations justified Iqtel’s copying of the command codes’). The court’s analytical focus must be upon the external factors that dictated Sun’s selection of classes, methods, and code—not upon what Google encountered at the time it chose to copy those groupings and that code.” opn. pg. 37.
“[T]he trial court was correct to conclude that the scenes a faire doctrine does not affect the copyrightability of either the declaring code in, or the SSO [sequence, organization and structure] of, the Java API packages at issue.” opn pg. 37.
“The district court found that the SSO [sequence, organization and structure] of the Java API packages is creative and original, but nevertheless held that it is a ‘system or method of operation . . . and, therefore, cannot be copyrighted’ under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Copyrightability Decision, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 976-77. In reaching this conclusion, the district court seems to have relied upon language contained in a First Circuit decision: Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d without opinion by equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). In Lotus, it was undisputed that the defendant copied the menu command hierarchy and interface from Lotus 1- 2-3, a computer spreadsheet program ‘that enables users to perform accounting functions electronically on a computer.’ 49 F.3d at 809. The menu command hierarchy referred to a series of commands—such as ‘Copy,’ ‘Print,’ and ‘Quit’—which were arranged into more than 50 menus and submenus.” opn. pg. 37 – 38.
“More importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the court’s ‘method of operation’ reasoning in Lotus, and we conclude that it is inconsistent with binding precedent. Specifically, we find that Lotus is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit case law recognizing that the structure, sequence, and organization of a computer program is eligible for copyright protection where it
qualifies as an expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself.” opn. pg. 39 – 40.
“While it does not appear that the Ninth Circuit has addressed the precise issue, we conclude that a set of commands to instruct a computer to carry out desired operations may contain expression that is eligible for copyright protection.” opn. pg. 42-43.
“Given the court’s findings that the SSO is original and creative, and that the declaring code could have been written and organized in any number of ways and still have achieved the same functions, we conclude that Section 102(b) does not bar the packages from copyright protection just because they also perform functions.” opn. pg. 45.
As for Google’s arguments that it does not infringe because the Google code’s interoperability with other Java apps, those arguments are directed to Google’s fair use analysis. Interoperability is ‘irrelevant’ to the copyrightability analysis. opn. pg. 45. The district court concluded that Google took only what was necessary to achieve interoperability, and relied primarily on two Ninth Circuit decisions: Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix, Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). “As noted, both cases were focused on fair use, not copyrightability. In Sega, for example, the only question was whether Accolade’s intermediate copying was fair use. The court never addressed the question of whether Sega’s software code, which had functional elements, also contained separable creative expression entitled to protection. Likewise, although the court in Sony determined that Sony’s computer program had functional elements, it never addressed whether it also had expressive elements. Sega and Sony are also factually distinguishable because the defendants in those cases made intermediate copies to understand the functional aspects of the copyrighted works and then created new products. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 606-07; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-23.” opn. pg. 47.
The jury was hung on the issue of whether Google’s use of the code was fair use and the district court refused to order a new trial. “‘Section 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use is fair, and the statute notes four nonexclusive factors to be considered.’ Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). Those factors are: (1) ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;’ (2) ‘the nature of the copyrighted work;’ (3) ‘the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;’ and (4) ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Supreme Court has explained that all of the statutory factors ‘are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purpose[] of copyright,’ which is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 575 (internal citations omitted).” opn. pg. 53 – 54.
A use is transformative if it adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message. “A work is not transformative where the user ‘makes no alteration to the expressive content or message of the original work.” opn. pg. 57.
The Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the district court on the fair use question and requested a new trial. “First, although it is undisputed that Google’s use of the API packages is commercial, the parties disagree on whether its use is ‘transformative.’ Google argues that it is, because it wrote its own implementing code, created its own virtual machine, and incorporated the packages into a smartphone platform. For its part, Oracle maintains that Google’s use is not transformative because: (1) ‘[t]he same code in Android . . . enables programmers to invoke the same pre-programmed functions in exactly the same way;’ and (2) Google’s use of the declaring code and packages does not serve a different function from Java. Appellant Reply Br. 47. While Google overstates what activities can be deemed transformative under a correct application of the law, we cannot say that there are no material facts in dispute on the question of whether Google’s use is ‘transformative,’ even under a correct reading of the law. As such, we are unable to resolve this issue on appeal.” opn. pg. 60.
